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This paper employs heterogeneity in institutional shareholder tax characteristics to identify the relationship
between firm payout policy and tax incentives.  Analysis of a panel of firms matched with the tax characteristics
of the clients of their institutional shareholders indicates that "dividend-averse" institutions are significantly
less likely to hold shares in firms with larger dividend payouts.  This relationship between the tax preferences
of institutional shareholders and firm payout policy could reflect dividend-averse institutions gravitating
to low dividend paying firms or managers adapting their payout policies to the interests of their institutional
shareholders.  Evidence is provided that both effects are operative.  Instrumental variables analysis
indicates that plausibly exogenous changes in payout policy result in shifting institutional ownership
patterns.  Similarly, exogenous changes in the tax code indicate that as the tax cost of paying dividends
changes, managers alter their dividend policy to serve their institutional shareholders.
Mihir A. Desai













  The tax disadvantage associated with dividend payments has generated numerous 
theories seeking to explain why firms choose to pay dividends.  Given the abundance of 
theories prompted by the tax disincentive of dividend payments, it is surprising that 
identifying the role of tax incentives in determining payout policy has proven remarkably 
difficult.  In part, this difficulty reflects the relative absence of variation in tax incentives 
across time.  As a consequence, existing studies of the effects of taxation on dividend 
payouts, such as Poterba (2004), employ economy-wide data over long time-series to test 
for the effects of dividend taxes on payout policies. 
  This paper employs heterogeneity in institutional shareholder tax characteristics 
to identify the relationship between firm payout policy and tax incentives.  Institutional 
shareholders vary in their tax preferences and firms, in turn, vary in the degree to which 
they feature institutional shareholder bases that are averse to dividends.  By integrating 
information on the institutional shareholder bases of firms with their dividend behavior, it 
is possible to analyze the degree to which the tax-based preferences of shareholders are 
associated with dividend payment behavior by firms.  Emphasizing heterogeneity in tax 
preferences within the class of institutional investors affords the opportunity to identify 
tax effects more cleanly relative to studies that employ the distinction between 
individuals and institutions and their presumed tax preferences.   
Across a variety of measures of the propensity of firms to pay dividends, the 
evidence indicates that there is a strong association between the composition of 
institutional shareholders by their tax preference and dividend payment behavior.  This 
relationship is robust to the inclusion of a variety of controls that have been shown to be 
associated with dividend paying behavior.  Tax clientele effects appear to be strongly 
present amongst institutional shareholders.     
  Such an association is consistent with two alternative explanations.  First, 
institutional shareholders may be sorting themselves across firms based on their dividend 
policies.  Alternatively, the tax-based preferences of firm shareholders may be shaping 
the dividend policy of firms.  In order to consider the degree to which either “investor  
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sorting” or “tax-based payout policy” is operative, plausibly exogenous variation in 
dividend policies or the tax-preferences of shareholders is required.   
In order to investigate the sorting hypothesis, instrumental variables regressions 
are employed where a first stage regression predicts dividend payments based on firm 
operating characteristics.  These operating characteristics are plausibly unrelated to the 
degree to which taxable or non-taxable institutions are shareholders in firms.  Second-
stage regressions that employ these predicted dividend payments indicate that the 
composition of institutional shareholders for a firm responds to exogenous variation in 
dividend changes.  Institutional shareholders appear to sort on the basis of dividend 
policy. 
  In order to investigate the relevance of the alternative hypothesis that firms are 
tailoring dividend policies to the preferences of institutional shareholders, the analysis 
employs exogenous variation in the tax price of dividends relative to capital gains.  This 
variation, created by legislated tax changes over the last two decades, is plausibly 
unrelated to preexisting dividend policies.  Interactions of lagged changes in this tax price 
with the share of dividend-averse institutional shareholders are strongly associated with 
changes in dividend policy.  Managers appear to alter dividend policy in response to the 
tax-based preferences of their institutional shareholders.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the 
extensive literatures related to our paper.  Section 3 describes the data with particular 
emphasis on the classification of institutions’ dividend preference and the empirical 
specifications. Section 4 presents the results and section 5 concludes. 
2. Related  Literature 
This paper relates to two expansive literatures. The first literature examines the 
relationship between clientele effects, institutional shareholders and dividend policy.  
Beginning with Elton and Gruber (1970), much of this literature examines market 
reactions to dividends to establish the role of dividend tax clienteles.
1  Such clientele 
effects could arise from non-tax considerations including informational advantages, 
                                                 
1 See Allen and Michaely (2003) for a review of this evidence.  
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distinct investment styles, or monitoring ability.  Institutions may be better informed and 
this informational advantage could be manifest in differing attitudes toward payout 
policy. Indeed, Amihud and Li (2006) study the relation between price reaction to 
dividend announcements and institutional holdings, and find evidence that institutions are 
more informed.  Hotchkiss and Lawrence (2003) report that institutions seem to have 
distinct investment styles based on dividend yields but they do not find evidence of tax-
based clienteles. Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1995) fail to find a significant change 
in institutional ownership after dividend omissions.  Del Guercio (1996) examines the 
role of dividends in the portfolio selection of banks and mutual funds, and finds that 
dividend yield has no power in explaining the portfolio choice of these institutions. Her 
evidence suggests that the prudent-man rule has an important role, but that dividends do 
not play a major role in institutional investor portfolio decision. On the other hand, 
Dhaliwal, Erickson, and Trezevant (1999) provide empirical evidence that after dividend 
initiation, the firms' institutional investor clientele changes based on their tax preferences, 
with a surge of ownership by tax-exempt/tax-deferred and corporate investors.   
Grinstein and Michaely (GM) (2005) provide a comprehensive investigation of 
the relationship between institutional ownership and payout policy. GM consider a 
variety of factors that could affect payout policy, including institutional monitoring 
(along the lines of Allen, Bernado and Welch 2000), free-cash flow problems as in Jensen 
(1986), taxation, regulatory changes and adverse selection, in order to establish whether 
payout policy affects the willingness of institutions to invest in stocks and whether a 
concentration of institutional holders, in turn, affects future payout policy.  While their 
results are affirmative on the role of many factors, they do not find meaningful tax-based 
preferences, consistent with the survey results in Brav, Campbell, Harvey, and Michaely 
(2005) that institutional investors as a whole do not show a clear preference for dividend 
over repurchase. However, GM conclude that it is “possible that there is too much 
heterogeneity among institutions to capture this effect when we are looking at institutions 
as a whole or even at subgroups of institutions (such as pension funds).”  
Our work builds on the foundation laid by GM and others by using heterogeneity 
of tax preferences within the class of institutional investors to investigate the role of tax-
based clienteles.  By comparing different types of institutions, rather than the typical  
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individual vs. institution comparison, we are able to isolate tax explanations relative to a 
variety of other explanations, including differential monitoring capacities and 
sophistication.  Institutional investors are also more likely to be pivotal and, indeed, 
Graham and Harvey (2001) provide survey results that firms do react to their institutional 
investors.  
Focusing on institutions and on the impact of tax on payout policy also enables us 
to significantly sharpen our measures of tax preference and payout policy.  Depending on 
their tax preference, institutions can be classified into three groups: the pass-through 
institutions for taxable investors prefer capital gains over dividend, the pass-through 
institutions for tax-exempt investors are neutral, and the corporations prefer dividends 
over capital gains, as dividends and capital gains are treated differentially.
2 Using a new 
database containing more precise classifications of institutions on the tax front, we more 
precisely estimate the tax preference of a firm’s aggregate institutional investors. We also 
refine the payout policy measure to better reflect the tax preference question. In 
particular, since our focus is not on the free cash flow problem, we are less interested in 
testing the overall level of payout, but rather the division between dividend and 
repurchase. This contrasts with GM, who do not directly study the composition of the 
total payout.
3  
Parallel to the efforts focusing on clientele effects for institutional investors, 
Scholz (1992) and Graham and Kumar (2006) examine portfolio decisions of retail 
investors to provide more direct evidence of the degree to which tax characteristics of 
investors are associated with their portfolio holdings.  This paper provides an institutional 
analog to these papers by exploring heterogeneity within institutional shareholders to see 
if institutional shareholdings feature similar clientele effects.   
                                                 
2 See Desai and Gentry (2004) for a discussion of corporate responsiveness to corporate capital gains 
treatment and Barclay, Holderness and Sheehan (2007) for an investigation of corporate preferences for 
dividends. 
3 In a related vein, Jain (1999) reports that institutions prefer to invest in low-dividend-yield stocks, 
whereas individual investors prefer higher dividend-yield stocks, inconsistent with a tax-based dividend 
clientele hypothesis which assumes institutions to be tax-advantaged. Strickland (1996) comes closest to 
our efforts by finding that taxable institutional owners prefer low-dividend yield stocks but also reports that 
tax-exempt investors do not appear to show a preference for either high or low-yield stocks.  
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This paper also contributes to the sizable literature that examines if dividend tax 
changes influence dividend policy.  Poterba (1987, 2004) employs time-series variation 
and economy-wide dividend payments while more recent studies – including Blouin, 
Raedy and Shackelford (2003), Brown, Liang and Weisbenner (2007) and Chetty and 
Saez (2005) – all examine how firms responded to the 2003 dividend tax cuts.  These 
studies typically employ managerial shareholdings and institutional shareholdings to 
sharpen their hypothesis tests of the effects of the recent dividend tax cut.  Bernheim and 
Wantz (1995) employs the time-series variation emphasized by Poterba to test the 
motivations for paying dividends while Perez-Gonzales (2003) uses this same variation to 
investigate if large individual shareholders shape the dividend policies of the firms they 
own.  To our knowledge, this paper is the first one to employ variation in tax-preferences 
across institutional shareholders to isolate the degree to which dividend policy at the firm 
level is related to the tax preferences of shareholders across a broader period.   
3.  Data and methodology 
  In order to analyze the relationship between tax preferences of institutional 
shareholders and dividend policy, the paper integrates detailed data on the characteristics 
of institutional shareholders with firm data on payout policy and operating characteristics.   
3.1.  Identifying the tax preferences of a firm’s institutional shareholders 
Previous work has measured the tax preferences of shareholders as a function of 
whether their shareholders were largely institutions or retail investors.  More recently, 
studies of the recent tax cut have classified institutions somewhat more finely but without 
reference to the tax preferences of the clients that these institutions serve.  In order to 
consider the degree to which firms are held by dividend-averse investors, we begin by 
supplementing data on institutional investor holdings with data on the tax preferences of 
the clients they serve.   
The institutional shareholder data used in this study are from the Spectrum 13F 
institutional investor holdings database. Investment managers who exercise investment 
discretion over $100 million or more in Section 13F securities must report to the SEC on 
Form 13F holdings of more than 10,000 shares or investments valued in excess of 
$200,000.  Data are available from 1980 to 2002.  However, a number of institutions are  
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improperly classified in 1998 and beyond. As a result, our analysis is limited to the 
period from 1980 to 1997.  To make the analysis based on institutional investors 
meaningful, we further limit the sample to those firms where at least 10% of the common 
shares outstanding are held by institutional investors that we could identify in the 13F 
data. 
Spectrum reports five types of institutional investors: i) bank trust departments, 
the clients of which can be either taxable or tax-exempt; ii) insurance companies, which 
are taxable overall but could have tax-exempt accounts for clients; iii) investment 
companies (open-end or closed-end mutual funds), the clients of which can be either 
taxable or tax-exempt; iv) independent investment advisors, whose clients can be either 
tax-sensitive or non-tax-sensitive; and v) “others” such as foundations, ESOPs, university 
endowments, and internally managed private and public pension funds, many of which 
are tax-exempt.   
In order to calculate the share of institutional investors that are dividend-averse, 
we follow the procedure outlined below.  Of all the institutional investors, banks and 
investment companies (mutual funds) are not classified as either dividend-averse or non-
dividend-averse from this study, as no concrete information about their taxable investor 
bases can be obtained.
4  Instead, we assume that these two categories have the same ratio 
of dividend-averse shareholders as imputed from the remaining institutional shareholders.  
Insurance companies are uniformly treated as not being dividend-averse as they are in the 
corporate form and thus enjoy the dividend reduction.
5  Finally, investment advisors and 
the “other” category are classified on the basis of their client characteristics. For these 
purposes, institutional holdings data are supplemented with Investment Adviser Public 
                                                 
4 Another important consideration is that banks and mutual fund families typically consist of many separate 
accounts or funds. To the extent that these accounts/funds don’t have the same level of tax-savvyness and 
that 13F reports only aggregate holdings data, documenting the existence of tax-sensitive trading using 
aggregate data might be expected to be more difficult. The multiple account problems might still exist in 
other types of institutions, but would be much less severe. 
5 There are some caveats. Life insurance and property insurance companies have different tax treatments 
and could have different reactions to capital gains tax overhang. Moreover, insurance companies invest in 
their own accounts large amounts of money on which they pay taxes, but they also invest on behalf of their 
clients through potentially tax-advantaged accounts. The 13F data does not allow us to differentiate on 
these. To the extent that this could generate noise, as a robustness check, we re-do the tests reported in this 
paper assuming insurance companies having the same tax characteristics as the mutual funds. The results 
are not affected qualitatively.  
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Disclosure (IAPD) data obtained from the SEC.  IAPD data contain investment advisors’ 
self-reported client bases broken down into ten categories: Individuals (other than high 
net worth individuals); high net worth individuals; banking or thrift institutions; 
investment companies (including mutual funds); pension and profit sharing plans (other 
than plan participants); other pooled investment vehicles (mostly hedge funds); charitable 
organizations; corporations or other businesses not listed above; state or municipal 
government entities; and “others” such as non-U.S. government entities. Investment 
advisors are required to report the percentage of business represented by each client 
category. 
Investment advisors can have different preferences over dividend versus capital 
gains, depending on the nature of the clients they serve.  We classify an investment 
advisor as dividend-averse if (1) there exists tax sensitive investors capable of exerting 
pressure on managers, or (2) managers of the investment advisor might for personal 
reasons care about the tax consequences of the portfolios they manage. Among 
institutional investors who, a priori, might be expected to prefer capital gains over 
dividends are investment managers for high net worth individuals and hedge funds. The 
interests of the former are served by their relatively small number, which facilitates 
communication and collaboration with and, ultimately, monitoring and collective 
discipline of fund managers. Managers of hedge funds, for incentive reasons, are 
typically required to invest a significant portion of their personal wealth in the funds they 
manage and so are likely to care about tax consequences of dividend versus capital gains 
for personal reasons.
6  
The profiling information from IAPD is used to distinguish independent 
investment advisors who serve primarily tax-sensitive clients from those who serve 
primarily non-tax-sensitive clients. We classify as tax-sensitive those independent 
investment advisors whose clientele consists primarily (≥50%) of high net worth 
                                                 
6 Many of the industry experts we talked to indicated that tax is an important consideration for some 
institutions. For example, Morgan White, managing director of Woodside Asset Management, Inc., which 
manages money for high net worth individuals and families, stated in an e-mail correspondence dated 
November 11, 2003: “Indeed, we do pay close attention to taxes when making selling decisions.” He went 
on to explain that they strictly follow “Highest-In, First-Out” selling of multiple lots to minimize tax 
liability, postpone realization of gains, and expedite realization of losses to offset gains realized in the same 
year.  
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individuals and hedge funds.
7 Institutions are classified as tax-exempt and thus non-
dividend-averse if pension funds, state and local governments, and charitable 
organizations account for more than 50% of their clientele.  This classification of tax-
sensitive and non-tax-sensitive institutions is fairly conservative.  As there are cases 
where clients cannot be clearly identified as either dividend-averse or non-dividend-
averse, these investment advisors are not classified.  For institutions categorized in 13F 
data as “other” we conduct word searches for “pension,” “endowment,” “foundation,” 
and variations thereof and identify as non-dividend-averse any for which these words 
come up in their names. Finally, for each stock in each period, we calculate the 
proportion of dividend-averse investors as the ratio of identifiable dividend-averse 
institutional holdings to the sum of identifiable dividend-averse and non-dividend-averse 
institutional holdings.
8   Figure 1 plots the mean and median of the proportion of 
dividend-averse institutions among all identifiable institutions, during the period of 1981 
to 1997. There is considerable time-series variation of both the mean and the median of 
the dividend-averse institution proportion, and at any time, there are a substantial 
proportion of a typical firm’s institutional investors that are dividend-averse: the mean 
and the median are both within the range of 25% to 50% during this time period and there 
does not appear to be a significant time trend to the series. 
3.2. Measuring  Payout  Policy 
Earlier papers have focused on dividend yield to study the dividend policy.  
Recent papers, such as Grinstein and Michaely (2005), Allen and Michaely (2006), 
Grullon and Michaely (2002) and Blouin and Nondorf (2004) pointed out that such 
measures provide an incomplete picture. If a firm increases dividend payment and share 
repurchase expenditures proportionally, it is difficult to conclude that the dividend policy 
is more (or less) tilted towards dividends.  Rather, such increase is a demonstration of 
                                                 
7 We also include investment advisors who do not file the IAPD forms but are identified in the hedge funds 
section of the Money Manager Directory. As reported by Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004), only institutions 
that conduct non-hedge fund businesses such as advising mutual funds and pension plans are expected to 
file for the IAPD disclosure. That they are classified as hedge funds in the Money Manager Directory and 
not listed on the IAPD form indicates that the majority of their business is in hedge funds. 
8 This calculation implicitly assumes that the unidentified portion of the institutional investors have the 
same proportional distribution as the identified portion of the investors. Such assumption clearly is not 
precise, but we are not aware of any systematic bias, thus the approximation might add noise, but not bias, 
to our empirical work.  
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overall increase in payout.  Accordingly, we will be focusing on the dividend payout ratio 
as defined below to better capture the relative importance of dividends as a form of 
payout rather than changes in the overall amount of firm payout. 
In order to measure repurchases, we follow the definition in Grullon and 
Michaely (2002) as the expenditures on the purchase of common and preferred stocks 
(Compustat industrial annual data item #115) minus any reduction in the value 
(redemption value) of the net number of preferred shares outstanding (Compustat 
industrial annual data item #56).  We define common dividends as the total dollar 
dividends declared on the common stock during the firm’s applicable fiscal year 
(Compustat industrial annual data item #21). The “dividend payout ratio” is defined as 
the ratio of dividends to the sum of dividends and repurchases.  By construction, our 
measure of the proportion of dividend payment among total payout is only well-defined 
for firms that either pay dividend or do stock repurchase during a year. Of an initial 
sample of 113,350  firm-year observations for which we have other data, 36,708 are 
eliminated as firms don’t either pay dividend or do repurchase during that year. 
Our measure of firm dividend policy may have a bias. Firms omitted because they 
neither pay dividend nor repurchase stock in a year might be more likely to prefer capital 
gains to dividends. Compared to paying dividend or repurchase, paying nothing leads to 
increase in the retained earnings at the firm, thus the share price will be higher. The 
practice of retaining earnings in the firm thus creates capital gains rather than dividend on 
the stock, therefore we might want to treat it as functionally equivalent to repurchase. Our 
approach excludes these observations from our analysis, and thus might have some bias. 
As a robustness check, we conduct tests including the firms with zero payout, but 
nonetheless have a cash-to-asset ratio of 10% or higher, and treat them as if they have a 
dividend/(dividend+repurchase) of zero. We were able to re-classify 14,043 firm-years 
that way. The results reported in our tables do not change qualitatively when we use this 
alternative measure of dividend payout ratio. 
3.3.   Empirical Methodology 
These measures of the tax-based aversion to dividends of institutional 
shareholders and dividend payout ratios are supplemented with various additional  
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explanatory variables.  We follow convention in constructing measures such as the levels 
of cash holdings, return on assets, market capitalization, earnings, ratio of capital 
expenditure to assets, and leverage.
9  Of particular note is the measure of ROA volatility.  
Following Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000), ROA volatility is measured as 
the standard deviation of the ratio of operating income to total assets measured over the 
5-year period from year -4 through 0 for a given year.  Summary statistics for the 
variables described above are provided in Table 1.   
The analysis begins in Table 2 by investigating the basic association between 
dividend payout ratios and the dividend aversion of institutional shareholders.  This 
analysis also investigates the relevance of industry controls at the two-digit SIC level and 
controls for other determinants of dividend policy that have been discussed in the 
literature for this basic association.  The regressions all have year fixed effects and 
standard errors are clustered at the industry level. In addition, the Fama-MacBeth 
regression methodology developed in Fama and MacBeth (1973) is also employed to 
address potential cross-correlation in the data.  The analysis in Table 3 considers if 
samples where institutions are more likely to be pivotal and where their tax preferences 
are more readily identifiable provide consistent results.  Tables 4 and 5 provide an 
instrumental variables analysis where exogenous changes in dividend payouts, as 
predicted by cash holdings and ROA volatility, are linked to changes in the institutional 
shareholder bases of firms.  Finally, Table 6 considers the role of changes in tax policy on 
dividend payouts by examining if firm payout policy responses to tax changes are linked 
to the degree to which their shareholders are dividend-averse.   
4. Results 
4.1.  Payout policy and institutional shareholder dividend aversion 
                                                 
9 Cash holdings is defined as the ratio of cash and marketable securities (Compustat Item #1) to total assets 
(Compustat Item #6). Return on assets is the ratio of operating income (Compustat Item #13) to total assets 
(Compustat Item #6). Market capitalization is the product of common shares outstanding (Compustat Item 
#24) and year-end price (Compustat Item #25). Earnings is defined following the standard accounting 
literature, for example, Rosett (2001), as Earnings After Interest and Tax (Item #18). Ratio of capital 
expenditure to assets is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures (Compustat Item #128) to total assets 
(Compustat Item #6). Leverage is defined as the ratio of the book value of debt to total assets, where the 
book value of debt is measured as book value assets less book value of equity (Compustat Item #6-
Compustate #216), and total assets is measured by Compustat Item #6.  
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Prior to investigating the relationship between institutional shareholder dividend 
aversion and payout policy in a regression framework, it is useful to investigate if a 
relationship is apparent in the raw data.  Figure 2 provides such an effort.  For each year 
in the sample, the sample of firms is partitioned into four quartiles depending on the 
proportion of their identifiable institutional investors that are dividend-averse.  
Observations are then aggregated across years within these quartiles and a mean payout 
ratio is calculated for each quartile. By construction, there are equal numbers of firms in 
each quartile.  The figure provides the mean dividend payout ratio against the quartiles’ 
average (mean) level of the proportion of dividend-averse institutional investors. As is 
clear from Figure 2, there is a negative relationship between the proportion of dividend-
averse institutions in a firm and the dividend payout ratio of the firm in the raw data.  The 
highest dividend-averse institutional investor concentration corresponds to an average 
dividend payout ratio of 73%, whereas the lowest concentration corresponds to an 
average dividend payout ratio of 58%. 
The specification in column 1 of Table 2 formalizes this analysis in a regression 
framework.  The negative and highly significant coefficient indicates that changing the 
share of dividend-averse institutional shareholders from 0 to 1 would be associated with a 
reduction in the dividend payout ratio of 11 percent.  The inclusion of additional controls 
in column 2 -  ROA, ROA volatility, earnings, market value, the ratio of capital 
expenditure to assets, the market to book ratio, and leverage – does not alter this basic 
finding.  The specifications in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 add industry controls and the 
association between institutional shareholdings and dividend payout forms remains 
consistent.   
To be consistent with a large body of literature in finance we also use the Fama-
MacBeth methodology to compute robust standard errors on the coefficient estimates.  
The Fama-MacBeth methodology is a convenient and conservative way to account for 
potential cross-correlations in residuals. As reported by Fama and French (2002), the 
Fama-MacBeth standard errors can potentially be two to five times the OLS standard 
errors from pooled panel data regressions that ignore residual cross-correlations.  
Specifically, we first run cross-sectional regressions for each year separately, controlling 
for fixed effects at the industry level, and report the time-series averages of the  
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coefficient estimates using the time-series standard errors of the average slopes to draw 
inferences. Because the Fama-MacBeth procedure does not take into account residual 
autocorrelations, it is further corrected by following the procedure in Pontiff (1996) to 
adjust the time-series standard deviations to allow for a first order autocorrelation in the 
coefficient estimates.  Columns 5 through 8 of Table 2 provide the results using this 
Fama-MacBeth procedure and the results of the OLS specifications are confirmed. 
In order to investigate the robustness of this association between dividend-averse 
institutional shareholders and payout policy, we also investigated if different cutoffs for 
the level of institutional investors holdings and the proportion of institutional holdings 
that can be identifiable changed the basic results.  To make sure that the institutional 
investors are the dominant shareholders in a firm, we repeated the specifications of Table 
2 but required that at least 50% of the shares outstanding (rather than 10%) are held by 
institutional investors.  In a related vein, to make sure that our dividend-averse 
institutional classification does not over-represent the true distribution of institutional 
types, we repeated the test requiring that at least 25% of the institutional holdings are 
identifiable (previously there was no cutoff)) as either the dividend-averse or non-
dividend-averse institutional holdings.  Table 3 reports the results of the robustness 
checks where we require both 50% institutional ownership of firms and that 25% of those 
institutional holdings be identifiable.  These results, on this significantly reduced sample 
size, are confirmatory of the patterns from Table 2.  It is interesting to note that the 
coefficient estimates are considerably higher – almost three times higher than the 
corresponding specifications in Table 2.  The coefficient estimates from column 4 of 
Table 3 indicates that changing the share of dividend-averse institutional shareholders 
from 0 to 1 is associated with a decreased dividend payout ratio of 33 percent.  Given that 
measurement issues are more limited in this sample and that institutions are more likely 
to be pivotal, these results are reassuringly significantly larger than those in Table 2.   
4.2.  Do dividend changes drive changes in ownership patterns? 
This negative association between the concentration of dividend-averse 
institutions and the dividend payout ratio provides direct evidence of clientele effects 
amongst institutions.  This evidence, however, does not indicate if institutional  
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shareholders are sorting or if tax-based preferences of shareholders are dictating payout 
policy.  In order to analyze if institutional shareholders are sorting across firms, Tables 4 
and 5 consider how plausibly exogenous changes in dividend policy shift shareholding 
patterns.   
In order to test whether exogenous changes in dividend payout ratios attract 
dividend-averse institutional investors, we regress the proportion of dividend-averse 
institutional investors on predicted dividend payout ratios, generated by a first stage 
regression using cash levels and ROA volatility as independent variables
10.  The premise 
of these specifications is that these variables are associated with changes in payout policy 
but are not directly related to the degree to which dividend-averse institutional 
shareholders are drawn to firms.  It is important to note that this is a setting where it is 
particularly useful to be focused on the share of institutional shareholders that are 
dividend averse rather than just the share of institutional shareholder per se. 
  The results of the first stage regressions are provided in Table 4.    When we 
regress the dividend payout ratio on the ratio of cash to assets and ROA volatility, we 
find that the coefficient on cash is negative and statistically significant, indicating that 
firms with more cash pay out disproportionately more through repurchases rather than 
dividends. The coefficient on ROA volatility is also negative, indicating that firms with 
more volatile earnings pay out disproportionately more through repurchases. The pattern 
is robust whether we do the univariate or multivariate regressions.  The predicted values 
from the regressions with both instruments are employed in the second stage regressions 
discussed below. 
  The second stage results are provided in Table 5.  The coefficients on the 
predicted values of the dividend payout ratio are negative and highly significant.  These 
results are fairly stable across specifications that include industry controls and additional 
controls for other determinants of institutional shareholding patterns.  In the specification 
in column four, the coefficient estimate indicates that a change in payout policy from no 
                                                 
10 Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) and Guay and Harford (2000) find that firms that pay 
dividends have more stable earnings than do firms that use share repurchases. They conclude that share 
repurchases are used to pay out extraordinary transitory earnings and dividends are used to pay out 
permanent earnings.  
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dividends to all dividends would result in a 20 percent reduction in the degree to which 
shareholders are dividend-averse.  These results are robust to the use of the Fama-
Macbeth procedure discussed above as indicated by the results in columns 5 through 8.  
In short, changes in dividend that are plausibly unrelated to the composition of taxable 
preferences of investors are associated with changes in the institutional investor 
composition.  Institutional investors appear to sort on the tax consequences of firm 
payout policy. 
4.3.  Do the preferences of institutional shareholders drive dividend policy? 
While the results of Tables 4 and 5 indicate that institutional investors are sorting 
across firms, it is possible that the results in Tables 2 and 3 could also be explained by 
managers responding to the tax-based preferences of their institutional shareholders 
through changed payout policy.  In order to investigate if such a mechanism is operative, 
we investigate if dividend policy responds to arguably exogenous changes in firm 
institutional investors’ tax preference.  These changes are identified as those arising from 
changes in the relative cost of dividends to capital gains and the proportion of firm 
institutional investors that are dividend-averse. 
  To measure the time-series change in the investor preferences for dividends 
relative to capital gains, we follow Poterba (1987, 2004). Poterba defines the tax 
preference parameter (θ) as the after-tax value of a dollar of dividends, relative to the 
after-tax value of a dollar of capital gains.  Specifically, if τdiv and τcg denote the marginal 
tax rates on dividends and long-term capital gains, respectively, then the dividend tax 













We could similarly define a tax preference parameter for corporate investors. As 
Poterba (2004) and Barclay, Holderness, and Sheehan (2007) show, there is little 
evidence that corporate investors affect and/or react to firm dividend policy. One possible 
reason is that corporate investors are investing for strategic reasons, and dividend policy 
is at best a second order consideration for these investors. For simplicity, we exclude the 
corporate investor tax preference parameter in our specification. In additional 
(unreported) tests including these parameters, they are not significant.  Furthermore, no  
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other parameter’s significance level is materially affected by the inclusion of the 
corporate tax preference parameter. 
Poterba (2004) uses aggregate data to study how the time-series change in the 
weighted average tax preference parameter affects aggregate dividend payments. He 
estimates a model similar to Lintner’s (1956) partial adjustment model of corporate 
dividends.  The annual change in real dividends, ∆ln Dt, is modeled as a function of the 
change in corporate profits (∆ln Profitt) and the change in the relative tax burden on 
dividends versus capital gains (∆ln θt).  In addition, changes in dividends are also a 
function of lagged levels of profits, dividends, and the relative tax burden. The 
specification he employs is: 
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t t t t
Profit
D Profit D
ε θ β β
β θ β β β
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ln ln
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As explained in Poterba (2004), the estimated long-run elasticity of dividend payout with 
respect to the weighted-average tax price is -β5/β3.  Using time-series analysis of 
economy-wide dividend payments, Poterba estimates that the long-run elasticity of 
dividend payout with respect to the weighted-average tax price is 3.9 to 5.1, depending 
on how exactly profit is accounted for. That suggests that a one percentage increase in the 
tax preference parameter will increase dividend payouts by 3.9% (or 5.09%) in the long 
run. 
While Poterba’s evidence is at the macro level, we employ our measure of a 
firm’s institutional investor distribution (between dividend-averse and non-dividend-
averse investors) to further test whether at firm level the tax preference change, combined 
with the change in the proportion of dividend-averse institutional investors, are likely 
affecting firms’ dividend policy. To do that, we interact our measure of the proportion of 
the dividend-averse institutional investors with the Poterba tax preference parameter, to 
form a measure of overall “representative investor tax preference”, as the weighted 
average value of dividend. In particular, we define the representative investor tax 
preference as  ( )    - 1 1   averse _dividend_ proportion averse _dividend_ proportion T × + × =θ   
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If firms indeed react to the tax consequence of its representative institutional investor, 
then, as the “representative investor tax preference” increases, dividend payment will 
increase.  Specifically, the regression specification we employ is: 
  () ( ) ( )( )
() () t t t
t t it t it
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where Dit is the dividend payout ratio for a firm-year observation. 
Prior to discussing the results, several points should be noted.  In the regression 
specification, we have changed the household tax parameter (θt)  to the weighted average 
tax preference parameter (Τ i,t ), so as to generate both time series and cross-sectional 
variation in the tax environment of firms’ representative institutional investors.  We have 
changed the ln of profit to ln of sales revenue, as profit can be negative for individual 
firms (but not for the aggregate data that Poterba employs). The use of sales in place of 
the (sometimes negative) profit is standard, as in papers such as Perez-Gonzalez (2003) 
and Grinstein and Michaely (2005). In addition, we can no longer use Fama-MacBeth, 
because we are using the time series variation of the relative price of dividend to capital 
gains (the Poterba theta). We instead add the year fixed effect, and industry fixed effect 
(because dividend policy is likely correlated with industry characteristics), and firm level 
controls that are used by other studies, such as Perez-Gonzales (2003) and Grinstein and 
Michaely (2005). We tried the specification with or without controls on market to book 
ratio, asset growth, beta adjusted excess return of the stock. The main results are not 
sensitive to these additional controls. As in the Poterba specification, the short-run effect 
of tax preference change on dividend payout ratio is captured by β2, whereas the long-run 
effect is by -β5/β3. 
Results for this specification are reported in Table 6.  Columns 1 and 3 of Table 6 
do not include the lagged value of theta and columns 3 and 4 add industry controls.   The 
short run elasticity of dividend policy to tax preference change is very weak and 
statistically insignificant corroborating the findings of Poterba. Longer run, there is a 
significant response to the tax preference change of investors. Using the calculation 
similar to Poterba (2004), the long run elasticity of dividend payout ratio to the change in 
representative investor dividend valuation is 2.11 in the first column and 1.77 in the third.  
18 
These results hold even after directly controlling for the time series variation of the tax 
preference parameter (θt), as reported in columns 2 and 4.
11 Firms respond to the tax 
preferences of their institutional investors, at least in the long run. 
5. Conclusion 
  Analyses that consider heterogeneous groups of investors such as institutions 
homogenously risk conflating tax attributes with other unique aspects of institutions as 
shareholders.  Similarly, analyses that emphasize dividends without considering the 
tradeoffs relative to repurchases may fail to capture heterogeneity in payout policy.  The 
analysis in this paper capitalizes on the heterogeneity in payout policy and heterogeneity 
within the tax preferences of a type of investor to provide direct evidence of the presence 
of dividend clienteles.  These clientele effects are more pronounced in the restricted 
sample where tax-preferences are more clearly identified and those preferences are more 
likely to be pivotal.  Such clientele effects are consistent with investors sorting to firms 
with attractive payout policies and with managers altering payout policy in response to 
shareholder tax-based preferences.  These alternative channels are not exclusive and 
evidence is provided that both are operative. 
     
                                                 
11 While we report the long-run elasticity in the same fashion as in columns 1 and 3, the estimated long-run 
elasticity in columns 2 and 4 are less interpretable, given we also directly control for theta.  
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quartile number. The quartiles are sorted within a year and then aggregated across years.
Note: This figure plots the share of dividend-averse institutional investors for companies in the sample in the paper.


























































Figure 2: Dividend payout ratios across quartiles of dividend-











































Dividend payout ratio 76,642         0.68            0.40            -            0.32          0.91          1.00            1.00             
Share of dividend-averse institutional 
shareholders
76,642         0.36            0.31            -            0.11          0.27          0.56            1.00             
Return on assets (ROA) 76,642         0.15            0.15            (0.08)         0.10          0.15          0.20            0.40             
ROA standard deviation 76,642         0.04            0.05            0.00          0.02          0.03          0.05            0.18             
Earnings 76,642         98.96          373.58        (118.25)     4.42          16.71        63.52          1,608.48      
Market capitalization 76,642         1,779.49     6,645.62     9.75          94.93        294.16      1,083.16     26,247.20    
Ratio of capital expenditures to assets 76,642         0.07            0.06            -            0.03          0.06          0.09            0.30             
Market to book ratio 76,642         1.12            1.69            0.08          0.47          0.78          1.33            5.42             
Ratio of debt to assets 76,642         0.18            0.16            -            0.05          0.16          0.28            0.66             
Ratio of cash to assets 76,642         0.10            0.13            0.00          0.02          0.05          0.14            0.62             
Ln (Sales) 76,642         4.46            2.43            1.50          2.95          4.47          6.05            9.93             
Table 1: Summary statistics
Note: Repurchase is the expenditure on the purchase of common and preferred stocks (Item #115) minus reduction in the value of the preferred shares outstanding 
(Item #56). Common dividends is the dollar dividends declared during the fiscal year (Item #21). Dividend payout ratio is dividend/(dividend + repurchase). Return 
on asset (ROA) is operating income (Item #13) / book value of total assets (Item #6). ROA standard deviation is the standard deviation of the ratio of operating 
income to total assets measured over the 5-year period from year -4 through 0. Earnings is defined as earnings after interest and tax (Item #18). Market capitalization 
is Item #24 * Item #25. Ratio of capital expenditure to assets is the capital expenditure (Item # 128) divided by total assets (Item #6). Market to book is book value of 
total assets (Item #6) plus market capitalization minus book value of equity (Item #216)), divided by book value of total assets. Ratio of debt to asset is (book value of 
total assets (Item #6) - book value of equity (Item #216)) / book value of total assets (Item #6). Ratio of cash to assets is the cash and short-term Investments (Item #1) 
divided by total assets. Ln(Sales) is the natural log of sales (Item #12).(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 0.71 0.67 0.64 0.67 0.62 0.68 0.67 0.69
(32.78) (62.94) (31.18) (32.72) (31.78) (31.58) (27.25) (31.82)
-0.11 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.08
(23.23) (22.05) (22.52) (22.89) (6.68) (7.31) (16.56) (16.56)
Return on assets (ROA) 0.29 0.38 0.27 0.30
(18.47) (24.17) (7.90) (14.69)
ROA standard deviation -1.50 -1.21 -1.50 -1.29
(45.48) (36.21) (5.06) (17.36)
Earnings 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(4.26) (4.52) (2.55) (9.17)
Market capitalization 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(3.94) (3.21) (2.28) (8.74)
0.01 0.18 0.04 0.07
(0.24) (7.03) (1.00) (3.84)
Market to book ratio 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.01
(2.08) (12.05) (0.22) (3.80)
Ratio of debt to assets 0.05 -0.11 0.03 -0.10
(5.97) (11.37) (0.36) (5.77)
Year Fixed Effects? YYYY NNNN
Industry Fixed Effects? NNYY NNYY
Adjusted R-squared 0.02 0.09 0.08 0.15 0.01 0.09 0.08 0.16
Number of observation 76,642    76,642    76,642    76,642    76,642    76,642    76,642    76,642   
Note: The dependent variable in these regressions is the ratio of dividends to the sum of dividends and repurchases.  Columns 1 
through 4 are OLS specifications with t-statistcs based on standard errors clustered at the industry level. Columns 5 through 8 are 
Fama-MacBeth regressions, with the resulting standard deviations further adjusted for potential autocorrelation in the time-series 
coefficient estimate, by adopting the method in Pontiff (1996) using AR(1) error terms. t-statistics are below the coefficient estimates. 
ROA is the ratio of operating income to total assets.  ROA standard deviation is the standard deviation of ROA for the five years 
prior to the firm-year observation.  Earnings is defined as earnings after interest and tax. Market capitalization is the market value of 
common shares outstanding. Ratio of capital expenditures to assets is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets.  Market to book 
ratio is the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity.  Ratio of debt to assets is the ratio of book debt to book assets.
Table 2: The Relationship between Dividend Payout Ratios and the Proportion of Dividend Averse 
Institutional Investors
Dependent Variable: Dividend Payout Ratio
Share of dividend-averse 
institutional shareholders
OLS Fama-Macbeth
Ratio of capital 
expenditures to assetsDependent Variable: Dividend Payout Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fama-Macbeth
Intercept 0.77 0.77 0.69 0.79 0.70 0.82 0.71 0.85
(11.49) (21.83) (9.43) (10.81)  (10.65) (12.32) (13.91) (15.01)
-0.33 -0.26 -0.32 -0.33 -0.21 -0.23 -0.23 -0.24
(19.73) (15.52) (18.64) (19.41)  (12.32) (13.17) (9.86) (8.97)
Return on assets (ROA) -0.13 0.07 -0.12 -0.19
(1.85)  (1.00)    (0.92)   (1.84)
ROA standard deviation -2.00 -1.77 -1.56 -1.64
(14.06)  (12.04)     (3.48)   (7.91)
Earnings 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(3.50)  (2.65)    (2.06)   (3.94)
Market capitalization 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.56) (1.24) (0.57) (0.20)
-0.10 -0.12 -0.10 -0.32
(1.38)  (1.41)    (0.58)   (2.93)
Market to book ratio -0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.02
(2.02)  (5.57) (0.35)   (1.20)
Ratio of debt to assets 0.15 0.04 0.10 0.16
(5.44)  (1.27) (0.83)   (2.34)
Year Fixed Effects? YYYY NNN N
Industry Fixed Effects? NNYY NNY Y
Adjusted R-squared 0.04 0.13 0.13 0.21 0.05 0.12 0.13 0.18
Number of observation 8,946     8,946     8,946     8,946     8,946     8,946     8,946     8,946        
Share of dividend-averse 
institutional shareholders
OLS
Table 3: Robustness of Relationship between Dividend Aversion of Institutional Shareholders and 
Payout Policy to Different Inclusion Criteria
Note: The dependent variable in these regressions is the ratio of dividends to the sum of dividends and repurchases.  Columns 1 
through 4 are OLS specifications with t-statistcs based on standard errors clustered at the industry level. Columns 5 through 8 are 
Fama-MacBeth regressions, with the resulting standard deviations further adjusted for potential autocorrelation in the time-series 
coefficient estimate, by adopting the method in Pontiff (1996) using AR(1) error terms. t-statistics are below the coefficient estimates. 
ROA is the ratio of operating income to total assets.  ROA standard deviation is the standard deviation of ROA for the five years prior 
to the firm-year observation.  Earnings is defined as earnings after interest and tax. Market capitalization is the market value of 
common shares outstanding. Ratio of capital expenditures to assets is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets.  Market to book 
ratio is the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity.  Ratio of debt to assets is the ratio of book debt to book assets.
Ratio of capital expenditures 
to assetsDependent Variable: Dividend Payout Ratio
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept 0.73 0.73 0.76
(404.15) (391.79) (377.10)
ROA standard deviation -1.30 -0.93
(42.48) (29.08)
Ratio of cash to assets -0.51 -0.41
(48.02) (36.90)
Number of observations 76,642                   76,642                   76,642                  
Adjusted R-squared 0.03 0.02 0.04
Table 4: First Stage Results for Determinants of Dividend Payout Policy
Note: The dependent variable in these regressions is the ratio of dividends to the sum of dividends and repurchases.  
ROA standard deviation is the standard deviation of ROA for the five years prior to the firm-year observation.  Ratio of 
cash to assets is the ratio of cash to total assets. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered at the industry level are 
below the coefficient estimates.Dependent Variable: Share of Dividend Averse Institutional Shareholders
Fama-Macbeth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 0.49 -3.36 0.49 -3.78 0.67 -2.97 0.55 -2.05
(47.72) (7.07) (24.37) (7.97) (15.46) (2.70) (22.43) (6.64)
Dividend payout ratio -0.20 -0.18 -0.20 -0.17 -0.18 -0.19 -0.15 -0.19
(12.89) (10.86) (12.43) (10.49) (5.30) (6.81) (8.85) (6.43)
Market capitalization 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(36.63) (33.39) (9.41) (13.37)
-0.03 0.09 -0.03 0.03
(1.68) (4.20) (0.96) 1.21
Market to book ratio 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(4.94) (1.52) (4.80) (0.36)
Ratio of debt to assets 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.00
(4.87) (1.60) (2.60) (1.43)
Year Fixed Effects? YYYY NNNN
Industry Fixed Effects? NNYY NNYY
Adjusted R-squared 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05
Number of observations 76,642      76,642      76,642      76,642      76,642      76,642      76,642      76,642     
Table 5: Second Stage Results for Effects of Changes of Dividend Payout Policy on Insitutional Shareholder 
Bases
OLS
Note: The dependent variable in these regressions is the the ratio of identifiable dividend-averse institutional holdings to the sum of 
identifiable dividend-averse and non-dividend-averse institutional holdings. Columns 1 through 4 are OLS specifications with t-statistcs 
based on standard errors clustered at the industry level. Columns 5 through 8 are Fama-MacBeth regressions, with the resulting standard 
deviations further adjusted for potential autocorrelation in the time-series coefficient estimate, by adopting the method in Pontiff (1996) 
using AR(1) error terms. t-statistics are below the coefficient estimates. ROA is the ratio of operating income to total assets.  ROA standard 
deviation is the standard deviation of ROA for the five years prior to the firm-year observation.  Earnings is defined as earnings after interest 
and tax. Market capitalization is the market value of common shares outstanding. Ratio of capital expenditures to assets is the ratio of 
capital expenditures to total assets.  Market to book ratio is the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity.  Ratio of debt to 
assets is the ratio of book debt to book assets.
Ratio of capital 




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change in log of sales 0.02 0.08 0.09 0.15
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
0.24 0.23 0.15 0.14
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Log of lagged dividend payout ratio -0.20 -0.21 -0.21 -0.21
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log of lagged sales -0.11 -0.10 -0.10 -0.07
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Log of lagged investor tax preference 0.43 0.32 0.38 0.26
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
Log of lagged theta 3.73 3.83
(0.51) (0.51)
Adjusted R-squared 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.29
Number of observations 76,642        76,642        76,642        76,642       
Estimated long-run elasticity of dividend 
payout  ratio to tax incentives
2.11 1.56 1.77 1.22
Change in log of weighted average tax 
preference for dividend
Note:The dependent variable is the change of the log of the ratio of dividend payment to the total of dividend and 
repurchases during a year. The independent variables are change and lagged variables of the log of sales, the change 
and lagged variables of the log of the tax-preference parameter, the log of lagged overall tax price parameter 
(Poterba's theta), and the log of lagged ratio of dividend to total payout. The tax-preference parameter is defined as 
the weighted average value of dividends relative to capital gain for institutional investors as measured by 
(theta*proportion_dividend_averse_institution + 1*proportion_dividend_neutral_institution). Robust standard errors 
are reported under each coefficient.
Table 6: The Effect of Tax Changes on Dividend Payout Policy